IMPLIED WARRANTIES

IN A LEASE.

DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,

HON. CLEMENT PENROSE.
Assisted by
ALvRnD.ROLAND HAIG.
WILLIAm A. DAvIs.
JOSEPH T. T&YwOR.

HOLLIS

v.

BROWN.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYlLVANIA.

Lease-Warranty as to Condition of House.
Where one leases a house and lot of ground for a term of years, there
is no implied warranty on the part of the lessor, that the house is habitable, and fit to dwell in, even though the situation of.the house is such
that it could not be used for anything else than a dwelling house; and an
affidavit of defence to an action for rent, which makes only this defence,
is insufficient.
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31ABITABLE CONDITION.

DWELLING HouSE.
The -above case finally settles the
law in Pennsylvania on the 'question involved, if, indeed, it had
not been practically settled by previous decisions, see infra. Habitable
condition is not implied in the lease
of a dwelling house. A. raty rent a
house from B. for five years, and
the day after find it uninhabitable
by reason of its 'aulty construction, yet A. has to pay the rent for
the term. The- rule caveat empfor applies. There is no escape;
'because there is no implied warranty that the house wasohabitable.
This is in accordance with the previous trend of decisions in the
State: See Wheeler v. Crawford, 86
Pa. 327. The opinion of Judge
WOODWARD, in Carson v. Godley,
26 Pa. 117,; Moore v. Weber,
.71 Pa. 429, page 432; Barns v.
' 157 Pa.

Wilson, I Crum. (Pa.) 303; Hazlett
v. Powell, 6 Casey, 297. As we
shall see, is in accordance with
the general drift of authority in
the United States. It is not, however, on the exact poihit involved,
as the law of England. We will first
trace the English authorities on
the subject.
As long ago as 1811, Lord MANSFILD decided the case of Baker v.
Holtpzaffell, 4 Taunt, 44. This was
an action for rent. The premises
in question had been let for one
year. Shortly after the first quarter's rent had been paid, the house
was burnt down. It was held that
the tenant had to pay the rent for
the remainder of the term. The

ground, on which Lord MANSFIELD
put the decision, was one peculiar
to the common law. The civil law
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would have looked at the lease as
a contract. Doing so, the question
would be necessarily decided in
favor of the tenant. He had leased
a particular thing, i. e., a house,
and the house, the subject matter
of the contract, had disappeared.
The contract was necessarily terminated. But Lord MANSFIELD
advanced at the question from the
standpoint of the English law of
real property. What was rented
was not the house but the land.
"The land," he says, "is still in
existence, and there was no offer
on the part of the defendant to deliver it up. The landlord could
not enter to rebuild."
While
Judge HnkATH adds, on this last
point, "the defendant might have
rebuilt at any period of the term,
whereas the landlord would have
been a trespasser, if he entered for
that purpose."
This was good
logic from the point of view taken,
but the absurdity of telling the tenant, who was lihble to be turned out
within a twelfthmonth, that because
lie could build a new house for the
benefit of his landlord and, therefore, must pay rent, is evident.
It is said by Justice HEATH that the
-ase had often been decided before
t nisi prius, though this is the
trstreported decision. The deendant evidently knew his case
vas hopeless, for he had appealed
'orrelief to Lord ELDON (Holtp-affellv. Baker,18Ves.ii6). But unike the life tenant in possession,
:he lessee is not a favorite with the
2hancellor, so the bill was disnissed.
The law of this country, unlike
lie English law, except where
Itered by statute as in Ohio and
llinois, has followed this leading
Ase.

After all, there is sonmething to

DWELI.1N;

HOUSE.

115

be said for the common law rule.
The burning of the house is the
fault of neither party to the contract. It is as fair that it should
fall on the tenant as on the landlord.
Iad equity interfered, it
might have divided the loss, requiring the tenant to pay half the
rent.
As we have said, the decision in
this first English case is undoubtedly still law on the point involved
both in England and America.
Where, however, the premises become uninhabitable, through a defect existing at the time of the
lease, the English decisions cannot
be made to agree with the reasoning of Lord MANSFIEr.D or with
the Pennsylvania case.
In1 1825, the case of Edwards v.
Etherington, Ry. & Moody, 11,268,
came up for decision. It appeared
that the walls of the house, for
rent of which the action was
brought, were in a dilapidated condition. The defendant, who had
occupied the house as tenant from
year to year, finding that the
house was unsafe, left it. The
landlord did not accept a release
for some time. The question involved was whether the landlord
could demand rent from the time
the defendant had quitted the
premises to the date when he had
finally agreed to accept them from
the tenant.
Lord Chief Justice
ABBOTT charged the jury that it
was for them to say whether such
serious rehsons for quitting existed
in the case, as would exempt the
defendant front the demand on the
ground of his having no beneficial
use and occupation of the premises; and that, through no fault of
his own, but through the fault of
the plaintiff, who ought to have
taken care that the premises should

IMPLIED WARRANTIES

have been'in such a state as to continue useful to thi defendant, the
house became unfit for use. The
verdict was for the defendant.
Vrom the 'first of the report of
this case, there is no way in which
it can be reconciled with the principle enunciated in Baker v.
Holtpzaffell, Lord Chief Justice
ABBoTT seems to advance towards
the question from an entirely different standpoint than that taken
by Lord MANsinLD. He looks
at the lease as he would at a contract for goods and chattels, and
asks whether there has been any
beneficial use- and enjoyment by
the tenant. In his mind, the beneficial use and enjoyment was the
essence of the cofitract. In Lord
MANSFIErLD's mind, the question
seems to have been simple whether
the tenant had been given control
of a certain portion of the earth's
surface, the fact that the lease
really contemplated the occupation
of a house being left out of consideration.
The next case, that of Collins v.
Barrow (1831), i M. & R. 112, departs, if anything, still farther from
the case of Baker v. Holtpzaffell.
There the defendant took the
house, the rent of which was in
question,under awritten agreement
by which he was to occupy for
three years and to keep the premises in a tenantable condition. He
had, in fact, quited the premises
without notice at the expiration of
the first six months. The defendant said that the house was unfit
for habitation for want of sufficient
drainage, whereby it became unwholesome, noisome and offensive.
Baron BAILEY, in his decision
remarked: 'I do not see that
the fact of the tenancy. in this
case, being under a written agree-
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ment, is material. In any case,
the tenant is bound to pay rent
during the time for which he has
contracted, unless he satisfies the
jury that, under the circumstances,
he was justified in quitting. I
think, however, that in point of
law he will be freed from his obligation to reside on the premises,
if he makes out, to the satisfaction
of the jury, that the premises were
noxious and unwholesome to re-"
side in, and that this state arose
from no default or neglect of his
o,wn, but from something over.
which he had no control, except at
an extravagant- and unreasonable
expense."
.The house in this case
was practically uninhabitable until
a sewer was built, and the court
held that the tenant was not bound
to build a "sewer, and if the landlord did not build it, the tenant
could move out and terminate the
lease. In the subsequent case of
Arden v. Pullen, io M. & W. 32T,
it is intimated that the report of
the case of Collins v. Barrow is
not complete, and that it is possible there existed an express stipulation on the part of the landlord
that he would build a sewer. Prom
the whole opinion, however, of
Baron BAiLy, it is evident that
this express stipulation was not
necessary for his decision. He
took the point of view, which had
been taken by Loid Chief Justide
ABBOTT, and which was the point
of view of the civil and not of the
common law. Had the rest of the
English judges advanced at the
question from the same standpoint,
they would have soon expressly
oierruled the earlier decision in

Taunton, but Lord

ABINGER,

in

the later case of Arden v. Pullen,
1o M. & W. 321, returned to the
common law rule.

II.ITABLE COXI)ITION OF A 1)VELLLNG

The declaration in that case
stated that on the 25th of March,
1839, by an agreement made
between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff agreed to let,
and the defendant agreed to take
of the plaintiff, for the term of
three years, from the 2 5th of December, 1839, a house and premises
at the yearly rent of thirty pounds,
payable quarterly, and the defendant, among other things, agreed
with the plaintiff that he, the defendant, would keep the said
premises in as good repair and condition as the same then were, and
would so leave the same on the
termination of the said lease, fair
wear and tear excepted.
The
breach set out was that the defendant had not paid the two quarter's rent, which became due on
the 25 th of March, 1842. The excuse of the defendants in their
plea was that the said house and
premises, by means and in consequence of age and natural decay,
and the badness of the material
thereof, and the bad and improper
manner, in which they were originally built, and the rotten foundrous miry and unsafe state and
condition of the walls, timbers
and foundations thereof, and for
want of good and sufficient sewerage
and drainage, etc., that the premises were in a ruinous, bad, and unsafe and dangerous condition and
wholly unfit and unsafe for habitation, and that the defendant had
requested the plaintiff to put the
house in good condition, and he
refused. Counsel for the defence
argued that the case of Collins v.
Barrow was in point; as it undoubtedly was. Lord AnI.GER,
however, took the position that,
unless there was some fraud or improper concealnent on the part of
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the plaintiff, the contract for letting the house was perfectly good,
and implied no warranty that the
premises were in a good condition ;
that the landlord, under the lease,
had only one obligation to perform,
to wit: not to disturb the quiet
possession of the tenant during the
term. The allegation in the plea,
he asserted, would not be good,
had it not contained the assertion
that the defects in the house arose
through the fault of the plaintiff.
As this allegation could not be
proved by the defendant, the real
question was, whether, when a
house turns out to be uninhabitable, the landlord is bound to repair it. "I think," says Lord
ABING R, "that without some express stipulations he is under no
such obligation."
Baron ALDERsoN was of the same
view in his opinion, lie cites the
case of Izon v. Gorton, 5 Bing. N.
C. 501 (1839). The case follows
Baker v. Holtpzaffell, the circumstances presenting exactly the same
question, the premises for the rent
of which the suit was brought
having been consumed by fire. The
peculiar circumstances of this last
suit, however, bring out very forcibly the absurdity of the English reason, for the Lord MANSFIFLD had
decided the case before him on the
ground that the landlord could not
enter to repair without being a
trespasser, and that the only person
who had a power to repair was the
tenant. In Izon v. Gorton the
tenant occupied two upper stories
in a house. The latidlord actually
did enter and repair. A man who
rents so many square feet of air space
fifty feet in the air, enclosed by
four walls of a room, is obliged to
pay rent for the space when the
house is consumed by fire, and a
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baloqn is the only method by
Place, at the rent of eight guineas
which he can reach his peculiar
per week, for five or six weeks, at
portion of the atmosphere, and this the option of the said Thomas
all because Lord MANSFi=LD reMARA.Brnx."
Under this agreefused to look at the lease as a ment, the defendalt and his family
contract for the use of a particular
entered into possession of the house.
thing, which it really was, and
On the following day, Lady MARinsisted, upon regarding it as
RABLE complained to the plaintiff
creating a temporary estate or that the house was infested with
interest in a portion of the surface
bugs, and he sent a person in to
of the earth.
take means for getting rid of them.
. In justice to our courts, however,
This means, however, did not prove,
it is fair to say that with us where successful, and at the end of the
the leased premises consist of a room
first week Lady MARRABLE rein the building, and the building is
moved from the premises and
entirely destroyed by fire or other- returned the key to the plaintiff.
wise, the tenant is discharged from
There was no stipulation in the
his obligation to pay rent: Stock- contract that the house should be
well v. Hunter, ii Met. (Mass.)
habitable. The fact that it was a7
448; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. furnished housewas evidence that
498; Pollock on Contracts, 363 et
it was to be used as a dwelling
seq.
house. Baron PARKE cites, with
Other English cases following
tipproval, the cases of Edward v.
Arden v. Pullen are Gott v. Gandy, Btherington and Collins v. Barrow,
2 E. & B. 845 ; Keates v. Earl Cadwhile Lord ABBINGER, who had
ogan, IO C. B. 591.
distinctly overruled those cases in
The English Courts, vhich. seem
Ardon v. Pullen, asserts here that
to be abandoning the .position of
ie is "glad that authorities have
Lord MANSFIELD in 1825 and i83o, been found to support the view
return to it again in 1839 and i84o. which I took at the trial," and,even
In 1843, however, the same Lord adds that, for his own part, no
ABBINGER, who had decided the
authorities are wanted,*a 's its comcase of Arden v. Pullen in 1842,
mon sense alone, enables him to
entirely abandoned his position in decide. The inconsistency of these
his decision in the celebrated case
two opinions was such that it soon
of Smith v. Marrable, ii M. & W.
became necessary for the learned
5. (But see Hart v. Windsor, 12 judge to attempt to draw some disM. & W. 68,. This case, on which
tinction between' them. This he
the peculiar English law on this did in the case 6f Sutton v. Temple,
subject is largely based, was an
12 M. & W. 52 (1843).
In this
action for rent brought to recover a
case the rent of a meadow was in
balance of five weeks rent of a
question.
The plaintiff refused to
furnished house at Brighton, which
pay the rent, because the meadow
had been rented by the defendant
turned out to be unfit for the
of plaintiff -under the following
pasturage of cattle. It is notclear,
conditions: "Mr. John Smith, of from the report of the case, whether
24 St. James Street, agrees to let, the tenant could have used the
and Sig Thomas MARRABLE agrees
premises in aify other way than as
to take, the house No. 5 Brunswick
a pasturage. In his decision, in
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•flivor of the plaintiff, Lord AnINGEL
R says: "If this case involved the
necessity of overruling the case of
Smith v. Marrable, I should hesitate long before I should acquiesce
in so doing so, for I entirely approve
of the decision which we came to in
that case." He then sets out the
ground of distinction.
The first
cause is the letting of a house and
furniture Being for both house
and furniture, it must be meant for
occupation. The furniture must
lie fit for use, i. e., so must the
house. But lie assumes that the
tenant in the case before him could
only use the land as a pasturage.
He adnits that the land could not
be used for pasturage, but it is not
the landlord's fault, lie has no
knowledge that his field is in a bad
condition and will poison a cattle
which are put upon it. Therefore,
he cannot be hel responsible. For
our own part, we cannot follow
this logic.
It seems to us that
there is no evidence that the plaintiff in Smith v. Marrable knew
that his premises were infested with
bugs or that they were so infested
from any fault of his. Why then
,hould that case rest on a different
principle than that of Sutton v.
Temple? Where is the real distinction ?
Following the trend of the decision in Sutton v. Temple, BACON,
B. C., in Powell v. Chester, 52 L.
T. Rep. 722, said that the principle
of the decision in Smith v. Marrable should be confined to where a
person rents a house for a month or
two at the seashore. In that limitation, however, there is no reason.
We believe that the Engiish
courts will sooner or later overrule
one case or the other and adopt a
consistent principle.
The case of
Wilson v.

H-atton. 2 L.

R.
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Div.) 336 (i877), would seem to.
indicate that there would ultimately
be embodied in the English law of
the obligations of the tenant under
a lease to pay rent the principles ofthe civil law. This last case, as
the case of Smith v. Marrable. was.
the rent of a furnished house_
When the tenant nmoved in she.
found that the drains were in such
a condition that the house was
not reasonably fit for habitationKExLY, C. B., said, in his opinion,
permitting the defence, "we haveallowed some argument to be addressed to us by counsel for thedefendant, not because we entertained any real doubt upon the
question raised in this case, but
because of the general importance
of the points involved, and because
of the comments which had been
made at various times on the law
as laid down in the case of Smith z,.
Marrable."
The attitude of the
learned judge is totally different
from that taken by Lord MANSvIELD in iSrI.

To his mind the-

contract is for a house, and not, as.
with Lord MANsFIELD for a piece
of land which may happen to have
a house on it. All through the
opinion, we see the. question of'
what the parties to the lease intended rather than how should we
decide the case as a technical question of real property. The only
case cited, as a case in point, is.
that of Tully v. Howling, 2 Q. B. I)182, which was a case of admiralty
law on an agreement to charter a
ship. The other judges who decided the case advance at the question from the same standpoint.
That this standpoint reaches results
which are entirely irreconcilable
with the American law and the
position of Lord -MANSMIELD in

Baker v. Holtpzaffell will

soon
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become apparent to the -English
Bench. To hold a man liable to
pay rent if the house burns down,
but to discharge him from the
obligation if it happens to"be infested with bugs, is absurd. The
American law which holds a tenant
liable under all circumstances,
except where tjiere has been fraud
or misrepresentation on the part of
the landlord, has atleast the advantage of being perfectly clear and
logically consistent.
The position of the American courts has
also this practical advantage, in
spite of its apparent unfairness to
the tenant, and the absurdity of its
conclusion when we look at the
real intention of the parties to the
lease of a house. -Somany tenants,
who have not inserted the fire
clause in their lease, have been
obliged to pay rentfor aburnt ruin,
that the law on the subject is well
known throughout the States.
Being well known, the parties put'
what they really intend in -black
and white, and in doing so, tend to
lessen litigation. If ever ' time, for
instance, that a tenant thought his
house was uninhabitable, he could
move out and- leave it to a jury to
say whether his action was reasonable, there would be endless suits
*on 'the subject, and we would go
over our experien6e in the law of
negligence, where it has taken
thousands of cases to enable us to
get any more definite statement of
the law than that a man should
exercise reasonable care. It is
sometimes questionable, and it
may be here, whether justice to be
obtained in each particular case by
a jury is as advantageous as having
definite rules of law, which may,
until they are generally known,
work substantial injustice. Take
the very principle that the tenant
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has to pay for his premises burnt
or not, can any attorney point to a
lease which has come under his
notice which does not provide for
the contingency of the premises
being destroyed by an act of God.
The followifig are the principal
American cases on the subject:
lMfassachusetts.-Here there - is
no implied warranty in the rent of
a dwelling house that the house
shall be habitable during the terms :
Bowne v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380;
Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cush. (Mass.)
242; Welles v. Castles, 3 Gray
(Mass.), 323.
Nor that a store rented as a
warehouse for dry goods shall b6
suitable for that purpose: Dutton v.
Gerrish, 9 Cush, (Mass.) 89.
New York.-The Massachusetts
rule on this question is adopted in
New York: Gillis v. Morrison, 22

N. B.

207.

New
Jersey.-Naumberg v.
Young, 44N. J. L 331,.345. See
remarks
of DEPUE, J.
Of course,
when a house is rented'
generally, with no circumstances
which indicate that it must be used
for a dwelling house only, there i s
no question that the landlord does
not warrant it suitable for any particular purpose: Howard v. D.oolittle, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 464. See
remarks of DUR, J., on page 274;
Jaffe v. Harteau, S6 N. Y. 398;
Cleves v. Willotfghby, 7 Hill (N.
Y.), 83, per BAiDsLF V, J. ; Scott v.
Simons, 54 N. H. 426; Loupe v.
Wood7, 5 Cal. 586; Royce v. Guggenheim, io6 Mass. "20i-2o2, per
GRAY, J. ; Robbins v. Mount, 4
Robt. 553; O'Brien v. Capwell, 59
Barb. (N. Y.) 497; Edwards v.
N. Y. H. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 245247, EARLE, J., and in Minnesota
the courts hae gone so far as to
say that, where the lessor stated

